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Vijay Prashad

A People’s History of the Third World

The Darker Nations

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HAVANA

Between Bandung and Belgrade, a group of hardened revolutionaries went into the mountains of Cuba to put their military inexperience to the test. Led by the charismatic Fidel Castro, these national liberation fighters suffered early defeats and became almost entirely isolated from the main political parties in Havana. Their persistence, generosity toward those around them, and élan won them allies from among the bruised classes. From the Sierra Maestra, their good energy enthused students to attack the Presidential Palace in Havana, women’s groups to fill Havana’s streets with major demonstrations, and workers’ organizations to hold a general strike against the regime of Fulgencio Batista, the U.S.-backed dictator and caretaker of Cuba’s wealth for the Las Vegas- and Miami-based mafia. In winter 1958, two years after the insurgency began, the Batista regime evaporated. Batista left the island with his comrade, the gangster Meyer Lansky. Castro’s small band entered Havana and took charge of the collapsed state.

The U.S. government was not pleased with this turn of events. Castro had lined up on the side of Third World nationalism. In his 1953 courtroom speech (“History Will Absolve Me”), Castro called on Cubans to fulfill their duty to revive the 1940 Constitution of Cuba. Pleas and legal challenges had not worked on Batista’s regime. “We were taught,” Castro said, “that liberty is not begged for but won with the blade of a machete.” The United States had a poor track record with national liberation and anti-imperialist movements in Central America and the Caribbean. The armies and allies of the United States had been prone to oppose these movements, assassinate their leaders, and deliver arms to
their monarchist or oligarchic opponents. Between 1900 and 1933, the U.S. military intervened to scuttle the national hopes of the people of Cuba (four times), the Dominican Republic (four times, including an eight-year occupation), Guatemala (once), Haiti (twice, including a nineteen-year occupation), Honduras (seven times), Nicaragua (twice), and Panama (six times). Most recently, in 1954, the U.S. government intervened to overthrow the democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in Guatemala. The new Guatemalan government had pledged itself to the national liberation program of extensive land reform and nationalization of the economy's commanding heights. Just before it could enact its agrarian reform and nationalize the Rockefeller-owned United Fruit Company, the U.S. Marines landed. Then, in 1959, when a right-wing coup brought François “Papa Doc” Duvalier to power in Haiti, the United States armed his Tonton Macoutes, who brought terror to the people. The Castro government had every reason to be suspicious of their northern colossus.

A year into the Cuban Revolution, the U.S. president Eisenhower ordered his administration to start covert operations against Cuba. Castro did not know this, but he might have sensed it given Eisenhower’s refusal to see him when he traveled to Washington, DC, to deliver a speech to the Association of Newspaper Editors in March 1959. Fearful that Washington might do to Cuba what it had recently done to Guatemala, the Cubans went to Moscow in mid-1960 to secure a pledge that the USSR “will use all means at its disposal to prevent an armed intervention by the United States against Cuba.” Despite détente and peaceful co-existence, the reality of interventionism led the Cubans to take refuge in one of the two major camps. Threatened by the United States, Cuba went with the Soviets.

The Soviet nuclear umbrella had, however, not done anything to deter the U.S. military in Vietnam. In February 1965, the U.S. Air Force began to bomb North Vietnam, and between 1964–65, the U.S. administration had either assisted or given the green light for coups in Bolivia, Brazil, the Congo, Greece, and Indonesia. The Soviets could not prevent any of this. For Castro, part of the problem lay in the new doctrine that had been developed by the Third World project and adopted by the Soviets, the “strange concept of peaceful co-existence for some and war for others.” Castro expected NAM and the USSR to do something concrete for Vietnam as well as other colonized people. This expectation and impatience marks the political debates within the Third World from the mid-1960s until the late 1970s. It is in this period that armed struggle
will be revived not only as a tactic of anticolonialism but significantly as a strategy in itself. 

If China’s Mao led a protracted armed struggle against the Japanese army and the armies of the old social classes of China, he did so because the concrete conditions demanded such a strategy. The Chinese line, as it was known, began to be lifted root and branch without much concern for the concrete conditions in China. The Cuban theory of the *foco* (insurrectionary center) and Fanon’s theory of revolutionary violence as well as Lin Biao’s theory of “people’s war” all appealed to this impatience. Militants and national liberation organizations in this period flooded the meetings of the Third World and demanded armed action against imperialism. They challenged the Soviet delegates and brushed aside any consideration of the limitations of popular anti-imperialist sentiment in the countries to be liberated by the gun. Some of the militants adopted the critique of the two-camps theory to suggest that both the United States and the USSR were imperialists, and the only force able to stand up to them was armed national liberation. The discrete reasons for the success of the Chinese and Cuban revolutions became less important than the mimicry of its method. That the Chinese took decades and the Cubans took a few years, and that the Chinese had to fight over an enormous landmass whereas the Cuban remit was an island, seemed irrelevant. The militants dismissed theory and debate in favor of the tactic of insurrection, with armed struggle as the means to seize and maintain power. Mass struggle and the central role of a party was not to distract the onward march of the revolutionary war.

The high point for the militants was a 1966 gathering, the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, held in Havana. The conference followed the lineage of Bandung and NAM meetings with two major differences. First, it drew together national liberation regimes and movements from all three continents (hence it was called the Tricontinental Conference). Second, while there was broad agreement on the problems in the world, there were grave disagreements on the strategy to confront the world’s predicaments. Sensing a weakness for the progressive forces, some wanted to pursue the line of peaceful co-existence while they built the UN institutions. Others wanted to move immediately to militancy, to challenge imperialism on the battlefield and through small acts of revolutionary violence or terrorism. At the center of the debate was Vietnam. The discussion over how to provide genuine solidarity to Vietnam helped focus the more amorphous dispute over political strategy for the various liberation movements, for the Tricontinental and NAM.
By 1966, the war in Vietnam had become diabolical. Half a million U.S. troops could not break through the Vietnamese fighters, and the aerial bombardment created both grief and resilient opposition among the population. As a result of Vietnam, the Third World powers shed most of their illusions about the Atlantic powers. Of the main leadership at Bandung and Belgrade, Nehru was now dead, Sukarno had been overthrown by a U.S.-sponsored coup, U Nu was under house arrest in Rangoon, and Nasser suffocated the last remnants of democracy in Egypt. Those who had taken charge of the Third World dynamic, such as Castro, Algeria’s Houari Boumédiene, Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, and Jamaica’s Michael Manley, had little patience with the First World. For them, its ideals had been compromised. Any supplication to the United States or its principle allies would be worthless.

At the Tricontinental, Castro thundered on about the war and the deplorable assaults, but “instead of gaining ground,” he pointed out, the U.S. armies “have lost ground.” The extraordinary defiance of the Vietnamese shocked the Third World. It was one thing for a poorly armed guerrilla force to overthrow the Batista regime or combat the Portuguese colonial forces, but it was altogether a different matter for a peasant army to face the full frontal assault of the U.S. war machine. Nothing was more riveting for the 513 delegates from 83 groups across three continents than the presentations by Nguyen Van Tien of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and Tran Danh Tuyen of the government of North Vietnam. If Vietnam won, it would be a victory for national liberation globally. The Tricontinental pledged its solidarity to the Vietnamese and looked forward to their victory.

Such pledges, however, can be empty. Guevara missed the Tricontinental. He had left Cuba for Africa, where he had begun to explore the possibility of joining the revolutionary movements in the Congo. In a letter to the Tricontinental, Che asked the hardest question of all: What is the value of solidarity when the imperialist guns were not challenged? “The solidarity of the progressive forces of the world towards the people of Vietnam today,” he wrote, “is similar to the bitter irony of the plebeians coaxing on the gladiators in the Roman arena. It is not a matter of wishing success to the victims of aggression, but of sharing his fate; one must accompany him to his death or to victory.” To give genuine solidarity to the Vietnamese, Che argued, revolutionary forces across the three continents needed to create a “second, or a third Vietnam, or the second and third Vietnam of the world.” As Neruda sang in 1967, “Who will erase the ruthlessness hidden in innocent blood?”
Che's fury eclipsed Neruda's elegy: "How close we could look into a bright future should two, three or many Vietnams flourish throughout the world with their share of deaths and their immense tragedies, their everyday heroism and their repeated blows against imperialism, impelled to disperse its forces under the sudden attack and the increasing hatred of all peoples of the world." At the Havana meeting, Castro met with the Bolivian Communist Party chief Mario Monje, who agreed to host Che and support his attempt to create a Vietnam in Bolivia. Che left Africa for Bolivia, began to organize a foco, but lost the support of Monje's Communist Party and therefore became isolated. His attempt to create a second Vietnam ended in his personal sacrifice in 1967 on behalf of anti-imperialism. Che's own failure did not invalidate his critique, though. Should solidarity cost something?

The USSR and China played a critical role in world affairs because they constrained the Atlantic powers' quest for primacy. The UN Security Council allowed the Soviets and the Chinese to threaten the veto or else condemn the actions of the Atlantic powers. What frustrated the Third World leaders was the lack of any other kind of response, and indeed sometimes a hostile reaction from the Soviets and the Chinese to the militancy in the Third World. Could the USSR threaten violence against the United States or else invade a U.S. ally as to sue for peace in Southeast Asia? Since 1955, the Soviets had adopted the theory of peaceful coexistence. This meant that they could offer moral and material support to intensify the class struggle where they deemed it important, but they would not export revolution by the gun (the Soviets defended their 1956 invasion of Hungary as their revolutionary duty to assist Communist regimes that had been threatened by a counterrevolutionary coup). Could China invade Taiwan to make the same point? The Chinese had already tried to do so in 1958, but they had to retreat when the United States sent along its nuclear-armed Seventh Fleet. For all its bluster about the export of world revolution, the Chinese could not afford to antagonize the United States and other Atlantic powers into a major conflict. In a 1964 statement on the Congo, Mao noted that each time the United States invaded a country, it would be advantageous for the world revolution. The United States had intervened in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Cuba, Germany, Japan, Korea, and Latin America. "It plays the bully everywhere. U.S. imperialism has overreached itself. Wherever it commits aggression, it puts a new noose around its neck. It is besieged ring upon ring by the people of the whole world." Imperialist powers had an inherent tendency to fight wars of conquest and subjugation, and as they
did so, they would confront people's tenacious desire for liberty and independence. Despite the dispute between the Chinese and the Soviets, both followed the same policy of giving verbal and material support to their allies and the class struggle, without entering into interstate hostilities themselves. Nuclear war had made direct warfare between the first two worlds impossible. It was now left to the nonnuclear powers to pin down imperialism's tentacles.

The NAM states and NAM itself did not have the means to join the Vietnam War. NAM could not send its armies to Hanoi, even as the Second NAM Conference in Cairo (1964) had stated that wars of national liberation are defensible, that they are the principal means to fulfill the "natural aspirations" of people being colonized by powers that were loath to transfer sovereignty, and that "the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible." NAM had supported the Algerian struggle in 1961, and it welcomed the victory of the Algerians in 1962. It also supported the main liberation movements in Portuguese Africa (Mozambique, Angola, and Cabo Verde). It was enough to support wars of national liberation when these were far away and much harder to take a principled position on the armed overthrow of a recognized government. Many of the NAM states had already begun to experience armed struggle within. The dominant classes of these states held the reins of state power, and wielded it against their internal critics. It was far easier to bemoan U.S. interventions and the ailing Portuguese colonies than to validate the tactic of armed struggle, especially if such struggles had broken out within an NAM state.

Nehru and Sukarno had been ruthless against the Communist movements in their own countries, and they were incapable of a genuine challenge to finance capital. Like Nehru and Sukarno, Nkrumah of Ghana enjoyed the momentum of a successful freedom struggle and disliked any opposition. His Preventive Detention Act and use of the state apparatus against the rail workers in 1961 led inexorably to the creation of a one-party state in 1964 with Nkrumah as Osagyefo or Redeemer. Unlike Nehru and Sukarno, however, Nkrumah attempted to delink Ghana from the global capitalist economy and pursue his own version of African socialism. In 1965, Nkrumah published Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, a book that predicted his own demise. "A State in the grip of neo-colonialism," he noted, "is not master of its own destiny." Nkrumah's popularity plummeted along with world cocoa prices, and in 1966, the CIA encouraged his opposition to conduct a coup against him. Nkrumah took refuge in Conakry, Guinea. While in
Guinea, Nkrumah studied the situation of the Third World and came to the conclusion that the only way to make a revolution given the bipolar world is by a protracted guerrilla struggle. Thus far, the Third World had used reasoned arguments to gain its ends. Appeals are not sufficient, Nkrumah asserted, even when these were eloquent. Success could only be “achieved by deeds,” and while these deeds threatened total war, “it is often their absence which constitutes the threat to peace.”

“Time is running out,” Nkrumah wrote in one of his manuals for revolutionary war. “We must act now. The freedom fighters already operating in many parts of Africa must no longer be allowed to bear the full brunt of a continental struggle against a continental enemy.”

These were not deluded statements. In 1961, South Africa’s Umkhonto we Sizwe began its violent career. In “Portuguese” Africa, the MPLA, the FRELIMO, and the PAIGC were in a full-scale war against a much-weakened colonial force. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZANU) and the South-West African People’s Organization began guerrilla warfare in 1966. Nkrumah’s vision of revolutionary war had become a reality in parts of Africa. He argued that all of Africa should join this struggle, not only to overthrow colonial rulers, but also as an instrument to radicalize the masses and create major social upheaval.

At the Tricontinental Nkrumah’s comrade, Cabral of the PAIGC, opened his address with the statement, “We are not going to eliminate imperialism by shouting insults against it. For us, the best and worst shout against imperialism, whatever its form, is to take up arms and fight.” For Cabral, like Nkrumah, colonialism and neocolonialism are two forms of imperialism, both of which negate “the historical process of the dominated people by means of violent usurpation of the freedom of development of the national productive forces.” “If we accept the principle that the liberation struggle is a revolution and that it does not finish at the moment when the national flag is raised and the national anthem played, we will see that there is not, and cannot be, national liberation without the use of liberating violence by the nationalist forces, to answer the criminal violence of the agents of imperialism.” In 1956, Cabral founded the PAIGC, which worked through all legal channels against Portuguese rule. When the colonial forces massacred fifty dockworkers in 1959 at the Pijiguiti Docks at the Port of Bissau, the Guinean population went over to the PAIGC. The party did not move to the armed path until 1962, only after it had secured the majority of the population’s support. The bloody war went on for a decade, and one of its victims was Cabral himself (shot by a disgruntled comrade). The PAIGC succeeded
in 1974, as Portugal’s junta fell apart. A flexible use of tactics based on a strategic anti-imperialist program drove the PAIGC. It had taken the legal route and had been able to conscript the bulk of the population to its side; only when it had this mass backing, and only when the dominant classes had begun to narrow its space for action, did it take to the gun. This is what distinguished the PAIGC from many of the other groups that used armed struggle, most of which had a more tragically symbolic approach to politics than a materialist one.24

The Tricontinental neither went out of its way to promote revolutionary wars or violent acts, nor did it condemn them outright. It did, however, offer its support for ongoing wars because, the final resolution contended, imperialists do not listen to exploited peoples, who “must resort to the most energetic forms of struggle, of which armed struggle is one of the highest stages, to achieve final victory.”25 This statement on behalf of armed struggle gave courage to people in the midst of major battles in “limited wars,” but it did not lead to any dramatic increase of militancy within the Third World. After Algeria’s victory in 1962 by armed struggle, the next major success came in 1974 when revolutionaries overthrew the dictatorial regime of Selassie. While the African continent began to wither under debt and policies enforced by the IMF, a popular movement in Ethiopia dispensed with the monarchy, enthroned a left-wing government, and immediately had to seek military assistance from Cuba and the USSR against a Saudi-U.S.-backed invasion by the armed forces of Somalia. Before the world could make sense of what happened in Addis Ababa, a progressive military junta overthrew the fascist dictatorship in Lisbon. Six African revolutionary movements took advantage of the turmoil in 1974 and declared independence (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé, and opportunistically, Zimbabwe).26 After years of guerrilla war, aided by the Cubans in Angola, the revolutionaries had success by the gun. Yet the victory in these colonies came in large part because of the weakness of the Portuguese state, now shaken by internal political reforms and economic instability. The armed struggle in Africa, then, succeeded only in areas where the colonial oppressor had been severely weakened by other factors; the war did play an important, but not decisive, role in the process. The African success certainly emboldened revolutionary armed struggle across the globe. But the jewel in the crown of anticolonial armed struggle came in 1975, with the conclusion of the revolutionary wars in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia)
against a considerable adversary, the United States. “Vietnam” and the national liberation armed struggle promoted at the Tricontinental encouraged revolutionary movements in South and Central America to confront the tyranny of their domestic elites and U.S. sponsors with the gun; Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguay, among others, held the torch for the armed path into the 1980s and beyond.27

A decade after the Tricontinental, in 1979, NAM convened in Havana for its Sixth Summit. Armed struggle had become less significant for the agenda of the Third World, with the victory of Vietnam over the United States and the defeat of the Portuguese in Africa. The Cubans had been active with their support in Africa, mainly for the anti-Portuguese struggles, but also in the Horn of Africa, and this continued despite the discomfiture of some states expressed at the 1978 meeting of the Organization of African Unity at Khartoum. The Chinese shift from militant confrontation with the United States to outright collaboration on foreign policy had also dulled the edge of international Maoism, not to speak of the military defeats faced by Maoists in India and elsewhere. Ninety-three countries attended the conference, where they heard the elder politician of the Third World, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, offer a reminder that whereas NAM was “a progressive movement, it was not a movement of progressive states.” In other words, the various NAM countries had their own agendas, their own sense of historical change, and their own strategies for social transformation. The internal development of these countries had something to do with the overall dynamic of NAM, but NAM’s own agenda could not be reduced to that of its constituent states.28 Nyerere called for the large tent approach to the Third World, to be less ideological at the gate, even as the meetings themselves could be a place to push each other to sharper positions. Better to hold discussions around concrete policy positions or else political programs than to oust people based on their insufficient revolutionary rhetoric. And Nyerere should know, being the leader of a movement that was not only eclectic but also innovative. Whatever the limitations of the Tanzanian struggle, and I’ll go into that in the next chapter, few would deny its inventiveness.

Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the Third World formed a unique political force outside the atomic face-off between the United States–United Kingdom–France and the USSR. Filled with tactical and strategic disagreements on how to deal with colonialism and imperialism, the Third
World nonetheless had a core political program around the value of disarmament, national sovereignty, economic integrity, and cultural diversity.

At each meeting, the leaders and representatives of the Third World laid out theses for their struggles, but there was one thesis that rarely came up for discussion. At the Tricontinental, Cabral raised the notion, but could not get the delegates to address it at length. Cabral would have been the one to raise this point, having told his party cadre in 1965, “Hide nothing from the masses of our people. Tell no lies. Expose lies whenever they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victories.” In Havana, Cabral said, “One form of struggle which we consider to be fundamental has not been explicitly mentioned in this program, although we are certain that it was present in the minds of those who drew up the program. We refer here to the struggle against our own weaknesses. . . . This battle is the expression of the internal contradictions in the economic, social, cultural (and therefore historical) reality of each of our countries. We are convinced that any national or social revolution which is not based on knowledge of this fundamental reality runs grave risk of being condemned to failure.” The Third World had immense internal weaknesses, which, Cabral apart, would not be addressed at the gatherings from Brussels to Havana. These weaknesses corroded the imagined community of the Third World, and eventually participated in the decimation of its agenda.

Who would have thought that by the mid-twentieth century the darker nations would gather in Cuba, once the playground of the plutocracy, to celebrate their will to struggle and their will to win? What an audacious thought: that those who had been fated to labor without want, now wanted to labor in their own image! By Havana, all the powers of the old empire had entered into a holy alliance to demolish the virus of anticolonial Third World nationalism; while John Bull and the Gaullists trembled at their fate in a world dominated by those they had once ruled, Uncle Sam lent his shoulders and wiles to keep things as close to the past as possible. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the heirs of Uncle Joe saw promise in the movements of the Third World, and even while they offered assistance to them, they did so with every attempt to steer the ship of history, rather than to share the rudder. Direction was anathema to the darker nations, which had been told what to do for far too long. Time now to deliver oneself to the future.

For all the exhilaration, however, the constraints on the new nations were enormous. They began their independence period with immense fiscal burdens, even though they possessed considerable raw materials
and other physical resources. Although they had populations with experience in all aspects of social life, the colonial educational systems had deprived them of scientific and technological talent (which they had to cultivate within a generation). Whereas the cultural worlds of the post-colonial nations had vast resources for the soul and spirit of people, the colonial matrix of inferiority and cultural division had a marked influence. Finally, that the leaders of the new Third World had to answer to entrenched old social classes meant that the horizon of social change was circumscribed. Cabral’s “weakness” is in this, if not so much more, and it is to this weakness that I now turn.

34. Nehru, at the 1961 NAM, noted that "we should approach [the nuclear powers] in a friendly way, in a way to win them over and not merely to denounce them and irritate them and make it even more difficult for them to follow the path we indicate to them." Quoted in *The Conference of Heads of State or Government*, 115.

Havana


6. The Latin American delegates had been in Brussels in 1927. Cuba had been present at NAM 1961. Cuba was also a major supporter of the Algerian War. Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). In April 1961, the Fourth Session of the Council of Solidarity of the Afro-Asian peoples in Bandung welcomed the first Latin American delegation to an Afro-Asian gathering. The Cubans who came to Bandung joined in a resolution to condemn the U.S. aggression on the island at the Bay of Pigs. Then, in December, the Cubans traveled to Gaza (Palestine), where the Executive Committee of the Organization of the Solidarity of Afro-Asian Peoples decided to host a conference of the three continents—a move pushed by Cuba. The Cubans then went to Mexico City to attend the First Latin American Conference for National Sovereignty, Economic Emancipation, and Peace (1961), which passed a declaration on behalf of the Tricontinental. Finally, at Moshi (Tanzania), the Third Conference of the Solidarity of the Afro-Asian Peoples in 1963 chose Havana as the site for the Tricontinental at the request of the Cuban delegation.


8. Ibid., 166.

independence despite all the pressure from outside and from within? Well, I could tell
you one thing: the presence of 450,000 American troops in South Vietnam had a hell of
a lot to do with it." Quoted in Jonathan Neale, *A People's History of the Vietnam War*

10. Che Guevara, "Message to the Tricontinental" (originally published by the Executive
Secretariat of the Organization of the Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and
Latin America, Havana, April 16, 1967), in *Guerrilla Warfare*, ed. Brian Loveman and
Thomas Davies Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 202. Che's state-
ment followed a 1962 speech by Castro: "It is the duty of every revolutionary to make
the revolution. In America and in the world, it is known that the revolution will be
victorious, but it is improper revolutionary behavior to sit at one's doorstep waiting
for the corpse of imperialism to pass by." Quoted in Dominguez, *To Make a World


13. The Soviet position is explained in Herbert Aptheker, *The Truth about Hungary* (New

14. Mao Tse-tung, *People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their


16. A.W. Singham and Shirley Hume, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments* (London:


18. Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (New York: Interna-
tional Publishers, 1966), x.

19. Ibid., 258.

lishers, 1968), 42.


22. Ibid., 102.

23. Ibid., 107. Cabral and Fanon are quite separate from the revolutionary groups that take
their inspiration from George Sorel: to strike fear in the heart of empire. Cabral and
Fanon are less invested in the psyche of the imperial forces, and more in the colonized.

24. Much the same trajectory as the PAIGC marked the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion, formed in 1964, but not on the armed path before the defeat of the Arab armies in the
Six Day War (1967).

25. *First Solidarity*, 63.

26. The victory of FRELIMO in Mozambique gave a fillip to the struggle of ZANU and
the Zimbabwe African People's Union across the border in Rhodesia to overthrow
South Africa's puppet.

27. The cult of the gun produced little tangible freedom for the Third World, and indeed,
as we shall see in the next chapter, it facilitated dictatorships by malign leaders who
 cloaked themselves in militancy to fend off challenges to their rule.

