

## CHAPTER I

# THE FOREBEARS

## *Imperial and Colonial*

## *Counterinsurgencies*

Making peace with the Indian is the primary intention of the prince and with it should one begin. . . . In peace the Indian gives vassalage and obedience, and in recognition of it does he give tribute to the prince, though the conquerors . . . are obligated . . . to indoctrinate them. . . . However, in order for these peaces to last, it is most important that the commander knows how to settle and protect them with sagacity.

*Captain Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, 1599*<sup>1</sup>

### ASYMMETRIC AND IRREGULAR WARFARE

In lectures given to a Spanish university in 1962, and published as *The Theory of the Partisan*, Carl Schmitt traces the emergence of modern guerrilla warfare to the Spanish irregular battles against the invading Napoleonic army in the early years of the nineteenth century. Schmitt claims that “[in] this war, a people—a pre-bourgeois, pre-industrial, and pre-conventional nation—for the first time confronted a modern, well-organized, regular army that had evolved from the experiences of the French Revolution. Thereby, new horizons of war opened, new concepts of war developed, and a new theory of war and politics emerged.”<sup>2</sup> Schmitt defines the four basic characteristics of the partisan as irregularity, mobility, a political aim, and telluric (i.e., tied to the soil) character. He further claims that the Spanish war is the first modern partisan warfare for two reasons. First is the modern nature of the Napoleonic military rather than any specific characteristic inherent to the Spanish guerrilleros themselves.<sup>3</sup> Just as important, Schmitt cites the tellurism of the Spanish

guerrilla war as inspiring the Romantic nationalism of Fichte and von Herder with their emphasis on the *heimat* (homeland). By this definitional sleight of hand, those struggles of colonized people against colonizers preceding Spanish guerrilla warfare (most obvious among them the aboriginal peoples of the Americas, but also the white settlers' partisan warfare against the European colonial powers) are erased, and the emergence of the practice and doctrine of modern irregular warfare is displaced to Europe.<sup>4</sup>

In fact, asymmetric warfare had long served colonial conquest, and it had even been incorporated into manuals of warfare as early as the first major wave of transoceanic colonization. In *The Military Revolution*, Geoffrey Parker tells us that after their initial catastrophic defeats in pitched battle, the natives of both North and South America avoided directly engaging European armies and instead resorted to guerrilla warfare. Parker quotes one New England preacher grumbling, "They doe acts of hostility without proclaiming war; they don't appeare openly in the field to bid us battle"; another complains that "every swamp is a castle [or fortification] to them, knowing where to find us; but we know not where to find them."<sup>5</sup> Their methods of warfare did not go unnoticed by the conquerors who studied these tactics. Bernardo de Vargas Machuca's *The Indian Militia*, written at the end of the sixteenth century and quoted at the opening of this chapter, "dismissed the entire pattern of European warfare," promoted the use of search-and-destroy commando units, and advocated the training of military commanders who "knew as much about planting survival crops and curing tropical ulcers as about laying ambushes and mounting surprise attacks."<sup>6</sup> Simultaneously, a vast swath of legal discourse was produced to take account of the anomalous figure of the "Indian," this obstacle to conquest of the new territories in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>7</sup>

Asymmetric warfare was crucial to the conquest of the Americas, Africa, and Asia. In those places, asymmetry was not necessarily engendered by the numeric superiority of the colonizers, and certainly not in the early years of the conquest. In fact, in most of the colonized places, the colonizers were at first numerically inferior, sometimes dramatically so; what gave them their military advantage was their access to superior arms and often savage methods of warfare, their utilization of divide and conquer in aligning with local factions (often via economic incentives), their cunning use of treaties and laws on which they reneged unscrupulously, their immediate establishment of central-

ized governance regimes and institutions that codified their system of domination and that in nonsettler colonies were most successful when deployed via local intermediaries or clients, and their capacity for ruthless suppression of any resistance in war or to their new regimes of rule. All that advantage was then veiled in the cloak of “civilization” spun from the weft of law and woof of popular and expert discourse.

#### COLONIAL WARS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

These colonial wars of conquest—fought most brutally in the second cycle of European imperial expansion in the nineteenth century—were numerous and often came at great cost to the indigenous peoples in blood, treasure, and control over their destinies. Although in a few distinct instances—and in some battles of protracted wars—the indigenous forces defeated the superior arms of the European forces, the overall picture at the end of the nineteenth century pointed to the subjugation of vast numbers of people across the globe by the European empires. Here, I briefly sketch three instances of asymmetric imperial and/or colonial warfare whose traces can be—often very transparently—detected in the subsequent doctrines and practices of the powerful states that fought those wars and where particular carceral or juridical techniques in counterinsurgency practice were innovated or consolidated. These are the French conquest of Algeria, the nascent United States’ wars against Native Americans, and the alternating butcher-and-bolt and policing policies of the British Empire in the northwestern and western frontiers of India.

##### *The French Conquest of Algeria*

I have often heard men in France whom I respect, but with whom I do not agree, find it wrong that we burn harvests, that we empty silos, and finally that we seize unarmed men, women, and children. These, in my view, are unfortunate necessities, but ones to which any people that wants to wage war on the Arabs is obliged to submit... We shall never destroy Abd el-Kader’s power unless we make the position of the tribes who support him so intolerable that they abandon him.

*Alexis de Tocqueville, 1841*<sup>8</sup>

These murmurs seem to indicate that the Chamber finds my means too barbaric. Gentlemen, war cannot be waged in the spirit of philanthropy. Once you choose war as an end, you cannot reject any means whatever. . . . I shall always prefer the interests of France to an absurd philanthropy directed towards foreigners who decapitate those of our soldiers who are wounded or taken prisoners.

*Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, 1840*<sup>9</sup>

Algeria was the gateway for French conquest in Africa. The subjugation of Algeria between 1830 and 1847 is known best for its utilization of the *razzia* as a tactic of warfare, the centrality of the military to both fighting and settlement, the establishment of an administrative and intelligence and surveillance arm—Bureaux Arabes—which recruited French Arabic speakers with knowledge of local customs to mediate between the state and the local chiefs or elders, France’s recruitment of fighters from colonized areas into its Armée d’Afrique from 1830 onward, and its establishment of the Foreign Legion in 1831 (whose headquarters were in Sidi Bel Abbes in Algeria until 1962).<sup>10</sup> Their earlier expeditions in 1830 also established a precedent for a degree of colonial violence that was to continue unabated until 130 years later. One of the earlier commanders, Duc de Rovigo, “ordered summary executions on the slightest suspicion, showed ‘unnecessary cruelty’ at places like Belida—sacked in 1831—and ‘swept like a destroying angel over the Metidja.’”<sup>11</sup> When after ten years this brutality proved too costly and ineffective in defeating the guerrillas, a change in direction was debated in Paris. Interestingly, Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud—who had fought under Napoléon in the Peninsular War (1808–1814) and who had condoned plunder and rape of the Saragossan civilians by his troops there—was originally opposed to French presence in Algeria, as he saw it undermining France’s European deterrence capabilities. But by 1836, he had begun to see Algeria as “a useful training ground for the French army” and a site of exile for domestic troublemakers. To conquer Algeria, however, he believed that sufficient numbers of troops were required to “strike at the morale of the Arabs everywhere.”<sup>12</sup>

The solution to the problem of raising an army to conquer Algeria was seen as settler colonization, which would allow for the generation of a colonial economy. Bugeaud writes explicitly about the aims of military settlement: it

would shift the burden of paying for the conquest to Algeria, where taxation and trade would support further conquest. Roads built by the army would also be used for trade, and the military men could settle in fortified villages they would build through the requisition of native labor. After a year of service these men would be given leave to marry and propagate. Bugeaud advocated the devastation of the bases of Arab economy and community; he claimed there wasn't much to destroy in any case. Bugeaud asserted that the Arabs "have none of these major centres of government, population and commerce at the heart of a civilized country, nor any of those large arteries that circulate the life of civilized nations: no inland points, no major roads, no factories, no villages, nor farms; all they have are a gun and a horse."<sup>13</sup> For the military men to conquer and settle, they must be young and vigorous; they must have made their careers in Africa; and they must "know topography, customs, habits, and, if possible, the language of the country."<sup>14</sup>

Tactically, Bugeaud believed that "we must forget these orchestrated and dramatic battles that civilized people fight against one another, and realize that unconventional tactics are the soul of this war," and that the basic principles for unconventional warfare were mobility, morale, leadership and firepower.<sup>15</sup> To ensure the defeat of Abd al-Qadir's guerrilla force and secure the acquiescence of Arabs, Bugeaud "wanted the natives to fear the action of his troops everywhere, thus giving his army a moral prestige which in itself would result in economy in the actual application of material force."<sup>16</sup> Thus, the *razzia*, a tactic borrowed from the Algerians themselves but exaggerated and further brutalized, was deployed. In the French version of the *razzia* in Algeria, the French forces "chopped down fruit trees, burned settlements and crops, and seized livestock. Few of the region's numerous Arab villages escaped destruction. What once had been hillsides 'teeming with rich crops' were transformed into blackened wasteland."<sup>17</sup> The *razzia* served mundane functions (the plunder of crops and cattle alleviated logistical problems of supplies), strategic aims (it destroyed the local bases of the economy), provided the French with prisoners who were used as "barter to pressure the tribe in question into submission," and terrorized the population.<sup>18</sup> When even the *razzia* was not sufficient, an officer serving Bugeaud ordered his subordinates to "kill all the men over the age of fifteen, and put all the women and children aboard ships bound for the Marquesas Islands or elsewhere. In a word, annihilate everyone who does not crawl at our feet like dogs."<sup>19</sup>

Other repressive measures were disguised in civilizing intent. Bugeaud's March 6, 1841 edict relocated civilians living near settler colonies into reserved areas and required them to carry identity medallions issued by the French in order to exit their reservations—most often to work for the settlers.<sup>20</sup> To ensure order, Bugeaud advocated forced sedentarization of tribes, as well as a system of indirect rule, stating “that any immediate reduction of the traditional prerogatives of tribal aristocracies would only augment the number of the metropole's enemies,” and putting this into effect by requiring, for example, that the settlers only acquire labor through tribal leaders.<sup>21</sup> The Bureaux Arabes, consisting of military officers and administrators, served as the intermediaries to the local chiefs, nominated and dismissed chiefs, inspected local populations, commanded auxiliary troops, and aimed to civilize and “improve” the tribes.<sup>22</sup> Bugeaud recommended deportation of troublesome tribes, including noncombatants, women, and children, to Martinique, Guadeloupe, or the Marquesas Islands.<sup>23</sup> He gave free rein to his lieutenants, which led to his officers entombing hundreds of intransigent civilians in one instance, asphyxiating with smoke another group numbering in the hundreds that was trapped in a cave, and being praised by Bugeaud in the bargain.<sup>24</sup> When Bugeaud was criticized in Paris, he resigned in disgust in 1847 and died two years later.

Bugeaud himself initially applied his counter guerrilla tactics and principles of fighting to fighting in “urban spaces and houses” against the revolutionaries of 1848. His ideas were later applied in a softened form made palatable for more humanitarian times, in the doctrines and practices of colonial warfare for which Marshals Gallieni and Lyautey were celebrated.

*The Indian Wars of North America*

The real essence of the matter is that devastation and annihilation is the principal method of warfare that savage tribes know. Excessive humanitarian ideas should not prevent harshness against those who use harsh methods, for in being overkind to one's enemies, a commander is simply being unkind to his own people.

*Elbridge Colby, 1927*<sup>25</sup>

Patrick Wolfe has famously written that in settler colonialism, “invasion is a structure, rather than an event; [and] expropriation continues as a founda-

tional characteristic of settler-colonial society.”<sup>26</sup> Such expropriation is, however, almost never met with the acquiescence of those dispossessed. The Indian Wars of North America began long before the United States emerged as an independent state and continued into the twentieth century (the Battle of Bear Valley against Yaqui Indians was fought in 1918). They attest to the continued, variegated, and multisited struggle of Native Americans, pushed further and further to the West through the course of several centuries by unrelenting and brutal settlement and warfare that sometimes became exterminationist.

One such moment was the passage of the Indian Removal Act (1830), which drove Native Americans out of the southeastern states toward the West. Before signing the act into law, President Andrew Jackson employed the soaring vocabulary of protection and paternalism, “humanity and national honor,” to justify the dispossession. Once the act was signed, however, a far more hard-headed language of white settlement and prosperity appeared to justify the act:

By opening the whole territory . . . to the settlement of the whites it will incalculably strengthen the SW frontier and render the adjacent States strong enough to repel future invasions without remote aid. It will relieve the whole State of Mississippi and the western part of Alabama of Indian occupancy, and enable those States to advance rapidly in population, wealth, and power. It will . . . enable [the Indians] to pursue happiness in their own way and under their own rude institutions . . . and [will] perhaps cause them gradually, under the protection of the Government and through the influence of good counsels, to cast off their savage habits and become an interesting, civilized, and Christian community.<sup>27</sup>

What followed the passage of the act was a brutal trek through hostile territories, during which significant proportions of native tribes perished through hunger, violence, and disease. Some tribes’ members tried to elude the removals; others, like the Seminole peoples of Florida, fought long guerrilla wars against the US forces.<sup>28</sup> Not long after, they were once again subjected to settlement, provocation, and warfare in the West. The wars almost always resulted in the dwindling tribes cornered into ever-smaller “reservations,” ostensibly set up for their protection, often on inhospitable and infertile land, thus providing a severely circumscribed space for monitoring and surveillance on the one hand and freeing up maximal tracts of much-desired territory for white settlement.

The ambiguity of the role of the frontiersmen—as warriors or police—meant that they could be found “patrolling, scouting, pursuing, and always

the endless work of building and maintaining the little forts that multiplied across the face of the West,” mapping territories, building dual-use (commerce and logistics) roads, and chasing “criminals.”<sup>29</sup>

Although the increasing professionalization of the US Army after the US Civil War meant that the military institutions began to develop self-conscious written doctrines of conventional warfare, lessons of fighting mobile irregulars with intimate knowledge of the physical terrain were passed down in vernacular or experiential fashion rather than through doctrine. Andrew Birtle points out that the US Military Academy at West Point discussed Indian wars in only one part of its curriculum, the course on law:

International law as taught at West Point approached the subject of Indian warfare in somewhat the same manner as it did the treatment of guerrillas and actively hostile civilian populations in civilized warfare. On the one hand, it maintained that the laws of war did not apply to aboriginal people—just as they did not apply to guerrillas—for the simple reason that “savages” did not abide by those laws. This meant that soldiers were free to employ the harshest measures necessary to subdue them. Yet academy textbooks also taught that principles of humanity and Christian charity demanded that soldiers employ stringent measures only when they were absolutely necessary.<sup>30</sup>

What was learned in the Indian Wars became the necessary, if unwritten, manual for subsequent overseas asymmetric warfare, in the Philippines, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Techniques deployed in the Indian Wars—some in use long before and continually perfected—included theories of collective responsibility, an impulse to “civilize” in order to pacify, the use of native and settler scouts and auxiliaries, the use of reservations as militarily useful spaces for concentrating and monitoring native fighters and civilians, timing the battles at night or winter to ensure lack of preparedness among Native Americans, and surprise attacks against villages to undermine the socioeconomic bases and independence of Native American communities.<sup>31</sup>

Many of the US military governors of the Philippines had fought and administered Native Americans, and they compared various Filipino peoples—both favorably and unfavorably—to their former charges.<sup>32</sup> Where in the “pacification” of the Native Americans “each tribe [had been treated] according to its particular level of cultural development,” similar hierarchies—in form if not

content—were applied to Filipinos on the basis of religious categories.<sup>33</sup> The concentration camps of the Philippines could trace their lineage to both the *reconcentrados* first used by the Spanish in Cuba in 1895–1898 and to the reservation system used in the US western frontier.<sup>34</sup> Filipino Scouts were modeled on the Indian Scouts.<sup>35</sup> Although discourses and practices were adapted to the specific contexts, a series of modularized tactics for counterinsurgency were devised that traveled from the Philippines (1898–1906) to Cuba (1906–1909), Haiti (1915–1934), the Dominican Republic (1916–1924), and Nicaragua (1927–1933), and were eventually institutionalized in the Marine Corps’ *Manual of Small Wars Operations* (1935) and the seminal *Small Wars Manual* of 1940.<sup>36</sup> This manual was then resurrected in the Latin American counterinsurgencies of the 1980s, providing a thread that connected the Indian Wars of the nineteenth century to US asymmetric warfare in the twentieth.

*Butcher and Bolt and the Sandeman System*

Sir Bindon sent orders that we were to stay in the Mamund Valley and lay it waste with fire and sword in vengeance. . . . We proceeded systematically, village by village, and we destroyed the houses, filled up the wells, blew down the towers, cut down the great shady trees, burned the crops and broke the reservoirs in punitive devastation. So long as the villages were in the plain, this was quite easy. The tribesmen sat on the mountains and sullenly watched the destruction of their homes and means of livelihood. . . . At the end of a fortnight the valley was a desert, and honour was satisfied.

*Winston Churchill, 1897*<sup>37</sup>

In Britain’s vast empire, the peoples of the frontiers, in particular in the Northwest Frontier, continued, throughout the nineteenth century and until decolonization, to resist British domination by frequently taking up arms against the attempts of the government to tax them, monitor them, or interfere in their civil affairs. Where the British had “pacified” indigenous revolt, civil authorities were eventually put into place; but the peripheries, especially in Punjab, Baluchistan, and Burma, remained under the control of military men till the very end of the empire and were the sites of chronic battles, expeditions, and punitive military measures.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the British used two distinct methods to deal with intransigent natives. In Baluchistan, the Sandeman system administered the tribes, whereas in the Northwest Frontier, the preferred strategy was the Close-Border System, which deployed “economic weapons,” a gentle euphemism for a combination of collective fines and butcher and bolt.<sup>38</sup> As one former high-ranking British imperial officer in the Punjab (and a biographer of Sandeman) wrote, in this system, “when outrages do occur the tribe is fined . . . and when fines accumulate to an unbearable extent, the tribe is punished by a blockade, or a military expedition, only to offend again when the effect of the punishment has worn off.”<sup>39</sup>

The blockades “kept the laborious, hard-working portion of the tribesmen from going about their lawful occasions” and aimed at “starving the tribe[s] into submission,” whereas the expeditions were described by the British military as a strategy of butcher and bolt that left scorched earth, destroyed villages, and “a legacy of hatred and contempt” behind.<sup>40</sup> They were intended also to act as deterrence: “The point then to be decided was whether the casualties inflicted were severe enough to discourage the hotheads who were in the van of the battle, and to discredit the mullahs who were behind it.”<sup>41</sup> Butcher and bolt did not distinguish combatants from civilians; the enemy was considered “the whole population.”<sup>42</sup> The forces used were native irregulars, and although intelligence was considered of immense importance, the topography and particular character of social life in the frontier meant that the government of India was desperately lacking it and was least equipped to know about this region than any other in India.<sup>43</sup>

As part of the process of cordon and search used during the expeditions, local hostages were used. As one Northwest Frontier British officer advised other British officers in Palestine:

It might be worthwhile forming a “hostage corps” composed of the sons of hostiles. A couple of these in the front car of a convoy would discourage the use of land mines. On the Frontiers we often push the relatives of an outlaw in front of a police party when entering a house where an outlaw is suspected of hiding.<sup>44</sup>

These practices of punishment and deterrence continued to be used as a means of terrorizing tribes into submission as late as 1939, with Winston Churchill having participated in one such expedition in 1897 and writing about it in

both his later memoirs and in *Malakand Field Force*. The Northwest Frontier had been so significant in British military practice that a substantial chapter of C. E. Callwell's *Small Wars* dedicated to "hill warfare" is primarily based on the area.<sup>45</sup>

The Sandeman system, in contrast, was considered the more humane alternative, a kind of "benevolent despotism" meant to "to deal with the hearts and minds of the people and not only with their fears," which even later masters of indirect rule and gurus of colonial administration such as Marshal Hubert Ly-autey were to emulate.<sup>46</sup> Sir Robert Sandeman refined a system of proxy control in Baluchistan through a policy of "peaceful penetration" based on "knowledge and sympathy" whose object was "the gradual civilization and betterment of the tribes."<sup>47</sup> This policy entailed "tribal service" and "subsidized control," best summed up by Lord Curzon in a letter of appreciation as consisting

in employing the tribes as custodians of the highways and guardians of the peace in their own districts; in paying them for what they did well (and conversely fining them for transgression); in encouraging commerce and traffic by the lightening or abolition of tolls and the security of means of communication; in the protection, rather than diminution, of tribal and clan independence, subject only to the overlordship of the British *raj*; in a word, in a policy not of spasmodic and retributive interference, but of steady and unfaltering conciliation.<sup>48</sup>

For its enforcement, the system depended on the always present, though veiled, threat of force, including the possibility of collective fines and punishments, the use of tribal *jirgas* to mete out punishments for ordinary crimes and for transgressions against the British, the strengthening of the role of the more affluent and powerful elite in a tribe at the expense of tribal democracy, and the potential to use military violence in the last instance.<sup>49</sup>

When after his death attempts were made to transmit Sandeman's system to Waziristan, it failed, because, the colonial officers wrote, "owing to the democratic feeling of the race, it is often the case that the headmen, if unsupported, cannot enforce authority over the more unruly spirits." In other words, the Pashtun *maliks* (landowners) were not as powerful as those in Baluchistan; and the Mahsud tribe of Waziristan was most intractable.<sup>50</sup> The main reasons for failure, however, lay elsewhere: Sandeman had had a significant military presence in Baluchistan, which served to remind the tribes of the costs of

noncooperation.<sup>51</sup> Further, a system that emphasized perpetual surveillance and massive military presence was too impractical in the geographically inhospitable and politically intransigent terrain of Waziristan.<sup>52</sup>

These two approaches to asymmetric warfare—unbridled force and direct control versus the use of local proxies to rule indirectly—were to be utilized again and again in some combination in the coming centuries wherever the British military faced unconventional fights.

#### COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE IN THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY

As empires consolidated at the end of the nineteenth century and militaries further professionalized, and later yet, as revolt in the colonies worldwide escalated and was encountered militarily, a number of names became associated with specific doctrines of asymmetric warfare or colonial policing. By writing about these men, I do not mean to indicate that they were the *sine qua non* of policies of rule or the only innovators of military action, but in a number of instances they have become the archetypes of a particular approach or advocates of a specific solution to problems of overseas domination. They are invoked—self-consciously and argumentatively—in the debates within the transnational epistemic community of civilian and military counterinsurgents. Many of their insights and practices have been canonized not only in doctrine manuals—the French David Galula’s in the 2006 US counterinsurgency manual, the British Kitson’s in Britain’s—but also in a more enduring fashion in embodied practices and institutional memories of men who fight. These thinkers and theoreticians of counterinsurgency can be categorized into two groups: the men who succeeded through warfare and military administration in installing or defending colonial regimes (Gallieni and Lyautey for France, Callwell and Gwynn for Britain) and the men who ultimately fought or promoted unsuccessful counterinsurgency wars against anticolonial forces (Wingate, Thompson, and Kitson for Britain; Trinquier and Galula for France; and Rostow and Vann for the United States). I have focused especially on their writings as regards confinement specifically and on questions of law and administration more broadly.

*Gallieni and Lyautey*

The pirate [the rebel] is a plant which will grow only in certain soils, and the surest method is to make the soil uncongenial to him. . . . Supposing that a piece of land overrun by rank weeds has to be brought under tillage; it is not enough to extirpate these weeds; that will only mean starting again next day; but it is essential that, where the ground has been ploughed up, the conquered soil should be isolated, fenced, and then sowed with the good grain which alone will make it impervious to the tares.

*General Duchemin, commander in chief of French Occupation Forces in Indochina, 1895*<sup>53</sup>

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new French doctrine of both warfare and postconflict rule emerged in Southeast Asia and Africa. After the brutal initial conquest of Indochina over a forty-year period and the forcible extraction of the Treaty of Protection from the Indochinese, local rebellion and resistance against colonial powers had to be dealt with both militarily and politically in such a fashion as to consolidate France's territorial gains and to ensure the circumvention of future rebellions.

In this, Colonel (later Marshal) Joseph Gallieni devised a series of new tactics and political strategies that influenced not only French colonial conquest in years to come but also counterinsurgency doctrine of the French and the United States after the Second World War. In 1892, to fight against Vietnamese guerrillas, led by De Tham in Tonkin, Gallieni adopted light mobile units and tactics of jungle warfare, abandoning Bugeaud's rapid military offensives and methods of mass brutality.<sup>54</sup> Gallieni was careful in surveying and mapping the areas he was to conquer, and he was adamant about securing the acquiescence, even if passive or reluctant, of the civilian population, to protect his supply lines. His pacification of the rebellious regions entailed not only his *tâche d'huile* (or oil-spot) military method, whereby areas were captured and "protected" in a gradual outwardly unfolding fashion, but also the stimulation of local markets and establishment of skeletal social infrastructure, such as schools or clinics, simultaneous with military expansion and consolidation in an area. The day-to-day administration of the area was then left to loyal

local clients, as “Gallieni was a strong believer in a *politique des races*, that is, in letting the local social groups rule themselves.”<sup>55</sup> To this end, scandalously in the eyes of French administrators, Gallieni armed loyal villagers. As Paul Rabinow recounts in his excellent *French Modern*:

The next step in pacification was to create new needs. First, one induced the rulers and their wives to adopt European clothing; others would soon imitate them. The natives had to learn French; a well-designed educational system would produce, in one generation, a pacified and devoted population, one thoroughly open to French ideas.<sup>56</sup>

This ostensibly benign bout of “modernization” and developmentalism had to be enforced at the point of bayonets and using the blunt instrument of the law. The Indochina criminal code passed in the 1890s placed limits on press freedom, assemblies, elections and activism, and using the suitably vague language of “public security” and “political trouble,” it provided the tools for suppressing political dissent against French rule.<sup>57</sup>

In 1896, Gallieni moved to Madagascar, overthrowing the Merina dynasty then ruling the island and later fighting against rebel groups in various parts of the island. His *tâche d’huile* method was consolidated here and put into effect in both military and civil domains, because in Madagascar, unlike in Tonkin, Gallieni represented unified command, required if military conquest and “civic action” were to go hand in hand. In Madagascar, Gallieni consolidated the French version of indirect rule, which became even more significant under his deputy (both in Tonkin and in Madagascar) Hubert de Lyautey. Once an area was pacified, Gallieni would set out to wholly transform the Malgache inhabitants. He did so through the appropriation of land from the local peoples (then made available cheaply to settlers) and their resettlement in new villages; the forcible acquisition of labor from the conquered natives, who were sometimes made to work their own alienated lands; and the gradual reengineering of their whole social world, including their sedentarization, transformation of their local authorities, and the enforcement of *politique des races*, or indirect rule via local chiefs.<sup>58</sup> In Gallieni’s own formulation in 1908, the administrative hierarchies placed Europeans at the apex “to direct and survey the ensemble, while indigenous authorities [administered] the *indigènes*, collecting taxes, overseeing the execution of public work, and all other economic and administrative tasks demanded of them.”<sup>59</sup>

Gallieni's military writings and practices of rule institutionalized a number of techniques that were to become core practices of a kind of a population-centric counterinsurgency (discussed in chapter 2): in military matters, wholesale destruction was no longer the primary or predominant means of subduing revolt. As he wrote in a famous memo to all his subordinate commanders on May 22, 1898, violence had to be held in reserve and carefully calibrated:

We must remember that unfortunately in colonial wars, the rebelliousness of the people is imposed on us all too often, but destruction should only be used in the last instance, and only as prelude to reconstruction. We must spare the country and its inhabitants, as the former shall receive our future settlers, and the latter will act as our agents and collaborators, in order to carry out our enterprises.<sup>60</sup>

In the conquered areas, soldiers of various imperial origins (as well as European volunteers of the Foreign Legion) provided coercive manpower.<sup>61</sup> Employing colonial soldiers in the wars of colonial conquest was not new to Gallieni's time and had long been utilized to keep down the costs of imperial conquest and policing, and because ostensibly white European soldiers did not have the tropical robustness of their colonial counterparts. However, by the late nineteenth century, as France itself became more democratic, conscription of citizen-soldiers could potentially "bring political influence to bear overseas."<sup>62</sup> Thus, to avoid the possibility of revolt by French soldiers, colonial armies were increasingly deployed in conquest.

Establishment of local proxies through whom the colonizer could rule also allowed for the appearance of independence. *Politique des races* permitted at once a dual system of control and the possibility of dividing the conquered populations for the ease of controlling them. For Gallieni the "phantom power" of the chiefs was something to which "the natives are accustomed and behind which we can manoeuvre more comfortably."<sup>63</sup> Aside from maintaining military control over an area, military officers acted as political overseers of the *politique des races* and were at the helm of reconstruction, managing the rebuilding (or building) of the holy trinity of roads, schools, and markets, using *corvée* labor if necessary.<sup>64</sup> If the civilizing mission was not openly discussed, a developmental agenda that saw the natives improve through better markets, education, and hygiene, was. Indeed, asymmetric warfare as "armed

social work”—as described by a twenty-first-century counterinsurgent—seems to be how Gallieni saw his work as a colonial officer, although he was less coy about the power levers hidden within developmental policies.<sup>65</sup>

Gallieni's great protégé, Hubert Lyautey, had been his lieutenant in both Tonkin and Madagascar and went on to become the military governor and resident-general of French Morocco between 1907 and 1925. His concerns were far more administrative, and he fulfilled his dream of building “a Cecil Rhodes career” by consolidating indirect French rule in Morocco, where he established the doctrinal verity that, “since the social and political dimension of colonial conquest is as important as its military aspect, *pacification* must rely on a constant and subtle mix [*dosage*] of both coercion and consent.”<sup>66</sup> Lyautey reinforced Gallieni's admonishment about calibrating the use of force:

The country ought not be handled with force alone. The rational method—the only one, the proper one, and also the one for which I myself was chosen rather than anyone else—is the constant interplay of force with politics.<sup>67</sup>

For Lyautey, the acquiescence of indigenous populations had to be secured; hence, “the answer was first force and *nettoyage* [cleanup]” and then “making administration as economical as possible, relying on local leaders, reducing effective costs, and neglecting unproductive regions.”<sup>68</sup> In Morocco, Lyautey went native, constructing “an exoticised, cosmopolitan home,” where he “loved sitting on Arab mats, drinking their strong coffee, eating their food, and adopting parts of their garb.”<sup>69</sup> He also ordered the wholesale transformation of cityscapes, building new European urban centers while annoying the French *colons* by his ostensible magnanimity toward the natives.<sup>70</sup> Where needed, however, the velvet glove was cast off the mailed fist. Rebellions in the mountains were subdued by tactics of siege warfare, with a particular emphasis on isolating and starving the guerrilla forces (and possible civilian collaterals).<sup>71</sup> In the urban centers, Lyautey preferred to rule through proxies, adapting Gallieni's *politique des races* to Morocco and calling it the “*politiques des grands caïds*.”<sup>72</sup> He admonished his officers to “never forget that in every society there is a class to be governed, and a natural-born ruling class upon whom all depends. Link their interests to ours.”<sup>73</sup> This emphasis on bolstering local chiefs' powers continues to echo through the social and political institutions and struggles of postcolonial states.

*Callwell and Gwynn*

But when there is no king to conquer, no capital to seize, no organized army to overthrow, and where there are no celebrated strongholds to capture, and no great centres of population to occupy, the objective is not so easy to select. It is then that the regular troops are forced to resort to cattle lifting and village burning and that the war assumes an aspect which may shock the humanitarian. . . . If the enemy cannot be touched in his patriotism or his honour, he can be touched through his pocket.

*Major General C. E. Callwell, 1906*<sup>74</sup>

In the 1930s handbook for British imperial officers, *Imperial Policing*, Major General Charles Gwynn, a British officer of Irish extraction who had served the empire in both West Africa and Sudan, usefully describes the “police duties of the Army” in the event of autochthonous revolt:

Excessive severity may antagonise [the loyal] element, add to the number of the rebels, and leave a lasting feeling of resentment and bitterness. On the other hand, the power and resolution of the Government forces must be displayed. Anything which can be interpreted as weakness encourages those who are sitting on the fence to keep on good terms with the rebels.<sup>75</sup>

Pitched somewhere closer to civil governance, the policing action that occupies Gwynn’s attention occurs where the British expect to continue ruling a population after the hostilities have been suppressed and, as such, are trying to avoid antagonizing the civilians from whom nascent rebel or revolutionary groups can recruit members and receive logistical and moral support. The principles Gwynn elaborates for imperial policing are fourfold: power has to remain vested in civil authorities and the army has to remain disciplined and loyal; force has to be the minimum necessary to get a job done (although “the sight of cold steel has a calming effect, and the steady advance of a line of bayonets has often sufficed to disperse a mob without resort to firing”); any use of violence has to be “firm and timely”; and the military and civilian authorities have to cooperate.<sup>76</sup> Further, in his postmortem of British policing action in Waziristan in 1937, Gwynn underscores the importance of local headmen

and of economic development as a corollary to military action.<sup>77</sup> Even more significant, Gwynn claims

that maintenance of order by punitive action alone does not provide a solution. A firm hand undoubtedly is the first essential, but little real progress can be made till the economic condition of the country is improved and the authority of the headmen fully established. . . . Penalties may be inflicted on headmen for failure to exercise their authority, but their authority is strengthened if they can point to the benefits conferred by peaceful and prosperous conditions where roads have penetrated.<sup>78</sup>

Gwynn helpfully distinguishes the policing role of occupying powers from conventional warfare and even asymmetric “small wars” against irregular troops, which he defines as “deliberate campaigns with a definite military objective, but undertaken with the ultimate object of establishing civil control” and in which “[no] limitations are placed on the amount of force which can be legitimately exercised, and the Army is free to employ all the weapons the nature of the terrain permits.”<sup>79</sup>

Perhaps this emphasis on a no-holds-barred approach to small wars is what accounts for the scorched-earth tactics of Lords Roberts and Kitchener in South Africa during the Boer War (1899–1902). The most important military document influenced by the Boer War is Major General C. E. Callwell’s *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, first written in 1896 and updated in 1906 with his experiences of fighting in the Boer War. The book is a veritable encyclopedia of nineteenth-century small wars, from French General Hoche’s suppression of the Vendée Rebellion to the continuous wars of the Northwest Frontier. *Small Wars* was immensely influential in consolidating British Army doctrine, with the doctrine manual of 1929 summarizing parts of it under the heading of “Warfare in Undeveloped and Semi Civilised Countries.”<sup>80</sup>

Callwell distinguishes between three classes of small wars, “campaigns of conquest or annexation, campaigns for the suppression of insurrections or lawlessness or for the settlement of conquered or annexed territory, and campaigns undertaken to wipe out an insult, to avenge a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous enemy.”<sup>81</sup> In a sense, the small war is fought not only for instrumental ends—facilitating settlement or acquisition of territory—but also as a performative of power, “of overawing the enemy by bold initiative and by resolute action.”<sup>82</sup> The basic difference between regular and irregular warfare

in Callwell's experience is degrees of civilization, which he distinguishes by categorizing enemies along a spectrum from "a savage race swayed by a despotic sovereign" to "independent clans" to "semi-civilised states."<sup>83</sup> This civilizational distinction also means that certain tactics—"committing havoc," for example—are encouraged by the imperial forces engaged in small wars that "the laws of regular warfare do not sanction."<sup>84</sup> Just as important is the idea that the habits and customs of the enemy are as important as their battlefield tactics.<sup>85</sup> If the imperial forces are learned, moral, and rational, the enemy is treacherous and capricious, and the enemy's victories depend on intuition rather than intellect.<sup>86</sup> A member of the "coloured races" is useless as a source of useful intelligence, "because his ideas of time, numbers, and distance are of the vaguest, even when he is trying to speak the truth."<sup>87</sup>

Callwell writes that tactics are crucial in small wars, because while the irregular enemy has the upper hand in strategy (with its knowledge of terrain and its ability to disappear), an imperial army can overcome their strategic handicap through tactical superiority.<sup>88</sup> These include what French doctrine writers later called *quadrillage* and *ratissage* (gridding a space, and raking it clear of enemy and/or logistical supplies); mobile columns in raids; the use of blockhouses and fortifications; and "punitive measures directed against [the enemy's] possessions" (because "uncivilized races attribute leniency to timidity").<sup>89</sup> *Small Wars* abounds with incidentally noted destroyed villages; slaughtered cattle; and whole areas laid waste by the civilized conquering armies. Callwell writes admiringly that in the French conquest of Algeria Marshal Bugeaud

perceived that he had to deal not with a hostile army but with a hostile population, that this population consisted largely of clans and tribes of fixed abode, and that to bring them to reason he must reach them through their crops, their flocks and their property.<sup>90</sup>

It is significant that so much of the book seems familiar from our readings of the Boer War, and so many of its admonitions and prescriptions (minus the racist language) from our contemporary counterinsurgency manuals, and yet as a US counterinsurgency guru has mentioned, in the whole hefty book, which has so much detail and so many pages dedicated to everything from hill warfare and bush warfare and infantry, mounted forces (including camel

corps), and artillery, there is a single sentence about that most famous facet of British warfare against the Boers, the concentration camp.<sup>91</sup>

*Wingate, Thompson, and Kitson*

Winning the hearts and minds of the people, and it is the minds that count, is a fine phrase but it requires a firm application of the stick as much as any dangling of the carrot. . . . Firm and seemingly unpopular measures of organization and control have to be used in order to ensure [the people's] protection and so create a situation in which they have a good chance of survival, and so of getting the carrot, if they cooperate with the government.

*Robert Thompson, 1969*<sup>92</sup>

Wingate, Thompson, and Kitson, whose experiences and innovations have been fully enshrined in counterinsurgency literature, follow the tradition of Gwynn and Callwell and act as important conduits for the transmission of counterinsurgency knowledge to others; from Wingate to the Israeli military; and from Thompson to the Kennedy administration in its war in Vietnam.

Of the three, Orde Wingate (1903–1944) was the most colorful and controversial. Wingate is honored by no less than David Ben-Gurion as the *hayedid* (“the friend,” in Hebrew) of the Israeli state who would have become its defense minister had he not died, and by Winston Churchill as “a man of genius who might well have become also a man of destiny.”<sup>93</sup> A dispensationalist, committed Zionist, and eccentric (he ate onions like apples and received visitors stark naked), Wingate had served in Sudan before coming to Palestine, and he went on to fight in Ethiopia and Burma before being killed in action there. He believed the Yishuv settlers to be most loyal to empire, and he thought the Arabs “ignorant and primitive” and “liable to panic.”<sup>94</sup> His principal invention in Palestine, the Special Night Squads, brought together British and Jewish policemen to patrol the Galilee at night during the Arab Revolt (1936–1939) and to attack Palestinian Arab villages as punishment for complicity with the revolt or “preemptively” to ensure they would not in the future. The Jewish personnel recruited into the Special Night Squads included the supernumerary police, who were drawn from the community of Jewish settlers and who were to form the kernel of the Haganah (the Yishuv’s military force), as well as the

Jewish combatant members of field companies established by Yitzhak Sadeh (and included Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan).<sup>95</sup> The Special Night Squads were brutally efficient, marching at nighttime, sometimes disguising themselves as Arabs; terrorizing villagers; and in some instances, as in Khirbet Lidd or Hittin, killing civilians who had stepped out to see why they were being attacked.<sup>96</sup> Wingate sometimes beat the villagers; at other times he humiliated them by forcing them to “smear mud and oil on their faces.”<sup>97</sup> Sometimes, he detained the Bedouin in the middle of the night under emergency regulations and kept them in administrative detention for months thereafter.<sup>98</sup> The Special Night Squads were something of a model for subsequent Israeli special forces, and as Moshe Dayan wrote, “in some sense, every leader of the Israeli Army even today is a disciple of Wingate. He gave us our technique, he was the inspiration of our tactic, he was our *dynamic*.”<sup>99</sup> The Special Night Squads were a precursor to the Chindits commandos Wingate set up in Burma, who operated clandestinely behind enemy lines. The Chindits, in turn, were the precursor to the British Special Air Service.<sup>100</sup>

Sir Robert Grainer Ker Thompson (1916–1992), who had been a Chindit in Burma, is a crucial figure in the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), not necessarily because he is a major innovator of particular counterinsurgency tactics for which Malaya has come to be known, but because he is a connecting node between Wingate and Vietnam (and beyond—Thompson advised the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith on its counterinsurgency against the anticolonial guerrillas).<sup>101</sup> Thompson, who had served under Wingate, admired Wingate and was inspired by him; he also learned much from him about special forces operations and jungle warfare, installing just such a force, the Ferret Force, in Malaya.<sup>102</sup> Thompson, as secretary for Chinese affairs in Malaya, was a crucial figure in the establishment and administration of New Villages—concentration resettlements for Chinese populations suspected of supporting guerrillas—in Malaya.<sup>103</sup> But Thompson is most famous for deducing a set of principles of counterinsurgency from the Malayan Emergency that are still studied by Anglophone militaries. His *Defeating Communist Insurgency* summarized the five principles of counterinsurgency thus:

*First principle.* The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable. . . .

*Second principle.* The government must function in accordance with law.<sup>104</sup>

*Third principle.* The government must have an overall plan.

*Fourth principle.* The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.

*Fifth principle.* In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.<sup>105</sup>

Strikingly, the last principle is a kind of reversal of Gallieni's *tâche d'huile* (by placing temporal priority on securing bases), and the penultimate principle has become a crucial characteristic of population-centric counterinsurgencies, as it focuses on the civilians or the political infrastructure of revolt.

After the Malayan Emergency came to an end, Thompson was appointed by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to the British Advisory Mission for Vietnam (BRIAM; a six-person group of military and civilian officers with experience of the Malayan Emergency) and was seconded to Washington, DC. There, on the basis of his experience with New Villages, he became an enthusiastic founder and supporter of the strategic hamlet concept.<sup>106</sup> Thompson saw in strategic hamlets' reordering of peasant life in the countryside opportunities for better control over populations and resources, and more effective processes of clear and hold.

Thompson was of the opinion that force had to be calculated and calibrated. This did not mean less violence, more lenient sentencing for detainees and prisoners, or fewer deaths (even as it applied to US soldiers), but rather a more measured approach. He emphasizes "the importance of police expansion and training programme and of the establishment of a coordinated intelligence organization" to supplement militaries.<sup>107</sup> The language of "protection" for civilians and the first principle of isolating "the insurgent both physically and politically from the population" is present throughout Thompson's *Defeating Communist Insurgency*. Thompson highlighted information operations and the role of intelligence, the importance of feet on the ground, and constant interaction between the military and the people. Absent is any sense of the attraction of ideologies of justice, or of popular movements having a base in the population. Despite the constant invocation of politics as a weapon against insurgencies, very little thought is given to the political foundations of anti-colonial or antioccupation struggle. In fact, the persistence or success of such

struggle is attributed to demographics: “To put the situation bluntly, *all the people of North Vietnam had to do between 1965 and 1968 was to exist and breed.* The United States Air Force could not interrupt either of those activities.”<sup>108</sup>

Frank Kitson, who ended his military career as commander in chief of UK Land Forces in 1985, had experience in fighting counterinsurgencies in Kenya, Malaya, Cyprus, Oman, and Northern Ireland. Kitson’s thinking about counterinsurgency was not only pivotal to the development of formal UK doctrine; he, like Thompson before him, was close to the center of an epistemic community of military and political thinkers who, as he recalls about a famous RAND symposium that brought many such men together, “all spoke the same language. Probably all of us had worked out theories of counter-insurgency procedures at one time or another which we thought were unique and original. But when we came to air them, all our ideas were essentially the same.”<sup>109</sup> The list of participants of the RAND symposium reads like a who’s who of liberal counterinsurgencies: in addition to Kitson, the names of Charles Bohannon (United States, Huk Rebellion of the Philippines), Napoleon Valeriano (Philippines, Huk Rebellion), David Galula (France, Algeria), Edward Lansdale (United States, Philippines and Vietnam) jump off the page. All participants insist on instrumentalizing civilians. The political base is considered an asset, a loyal local leadership a necessity, and the job of the counterinsurgent is achieving a decisive military victory followed by securing control of areas. Although all speak about the economic and political causes of revolts, few acknowledge that social transformation can possibly be a desired outcome. For them, the goal of counterinsurgency is simply a more efficient and effective authority structure.

In a later work, Kitson attributes the emergence of popular revolt to “the changing attitude of people towards authority” and to “the development of techniques by which men can influence the thoughts and actions of men.”<sup>110</sup> In the symposium, he puts this more bluntly:

The main cause of the Mau Mau rebellion [of Kenya] . . . was the discontent and bitterness of men such as Jomo Kenyatta, who had been educated abroad far beyond the level to which they could hope, at that time, to rise when they returned to the colony. Intensely nationalistic themselves, they incited the people to indignation and revolt over a bogus issue (they asserted, quite falsely, that land had been stolen from

the Kikuyu), skilfully interweaving the movement with elements of spiritualistic cult that appealed strongly to the African natives.<sup>111</sup>

Kitson manages skillfully to distil a significant number of clichés and tropes of colonial counterinsurgency in one paragraph: denial of the role of settler colonialism in the dispossession of the indigenous populations, the manipulation of a population by unscrupulous leaders, the primitiveness and superstitions of this population, and the uppity native leader who gets beyond his station by being educated abroad.

Because of the range of counterinsurgencies in which Kitson served, his experiences reveal the extent to which implicit “civilizational” (if not openly racial) hierarchies structure the variation between different counterinsurgencies. Kitson is well known for having challenged internment in Northern Ireland as unproductive, for needlessly inciting the civilian population, which was “bought up in a free country,” but he was avowedly comfortable with using the same tactic for native Kenyans (or indeed Cypriots), because after all the Mau Mau were, for him, associated with “all that was foul and terrible in primitive savagery.”<sup>112</sup>

Another striking aspect of Kitson’s writing is his suggestion that counterinsurgency methods and tactics can also be employed to control and suppress popular revolt domestically. Writing in the early 1970s, Kitson was deeply aware of the upheavals caused by discontent and revolt within European cities, and as such, he saw the population control measures of counterinsurgency as relevant to “a situation which was beyond the power of the police to handle,” because “fumbling at this juncture might have grave consequences even to the extent of undermining confidence in the whole system of government.”<sup>113</sup> Although his idea about importing counterinsurgency tactics into British cities runs counter to his assertion that people “brought up in a free country” should be subjected to the same harsh measures as the far enemy, nevertheless, his argument openly calls for the portability of military measures used to quell quarrelsome colonial natives and their transplantation into metropolitan policing.<sup>114</sup>

### *Trinquier and Galula*

*When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered. Subversion is literally administration with a minus sign in front.*

*Bernard Fall, 1965*<sup>115</sup>

Revolutionary war can't be waged with the Habeas Corpus.  
*Colonel Charles Lacheroy, 1957*<sup>116</sup>

David Galula, “the Clausewitz of Counterinsurgency,” has had an extraordinary influence on US counterinsurgency doctrine. His writings of the 1960s were in fact not translated into French (his native language) until 2008, even if the experiences from which he abstracted his general theories of counterinsurgency were generated during the French suppression of the Algerian revolution.<sup>117</sup>

Galula's two books, the first produced under the auspices of the RAND Corporation, the second while on a fellowship at Harvard University, present a comprehensive analysis of insurgencies and prescriptions for counterinsurgency, with the former focusing on the concrete experience of antiguerrilla warfare in the Kabyle region of Algeria and the latter abstracting principles of counterinsurgency learned in battle.<sup>118</sup> Indeed, Galula's analysis is invoked again and again as most useful and relevant to the US counterinsurgency in Iraq. Galula sees insurgencies as endogenous events (whether communist or “bourgeois-national”) that depend on a core cadre dedicated to a cause; are able to mobilize because of their “freedom from any responsibility” to maintain law and order; and “appeal to the passions of many among the millions of Moslems, a passionate race if ever there was one.”<sup>119</sup>

Galula writes that, early on in counterinsurgencies, a judicial system that is not stripped down through emergency measures allows far too much latitude for captured dissidents and guerrillas.<sup>120</sup> Preemptive measures can alleviate this problem, in addition to surveillance and infiltration of the insurgents, thus “adapting the judicial system to the threat, strengthening the bureaucracy, reinforcing the police and armed forces may discourage insurgency attempts, if the counterinsurgent leadership is resolute and vigilant.”<sup>121</sup>

Later, native experts (or French experts gone native) are needed, but they need “protection,” which is provided through what can best be called a “surging” of troops throughout Algeria.<sup>122</sup> *Quadrillage*—or the gridding and gradual conquest of rural and urban spaces—becomes a central tactic of the French military, with the aim of “break[ing] the rebels' armed forces and then [pacifying] the population.”<sup>123</sup> Pacification happens through finding local allies, “to identify those Moslems who were for us, to rely on them to rally the majority of the population, and together to eliminate the rebels and their militant supporters.”<sup>124</sup> In addition to local allies, the constant presence of the French

soldiers is routinized, and the population is counted, measured, monitored, placed under surveillance, punished and fined for intransigence, requisitioned for labor, and paid. Although Galula admiringly recalls a French paratrooper's purge of the Casbah in the Battle of Algiers—"Give me one hundred resolute men and I will terrorize a city like Paris"<sup>125</sup>—he actually focuses on acquisition of consent through persuading an ostensibly neutral civilian population through the provision of protection and security. Galula concludes with the "laws" of counterinsurgency:

The first law. The objective is the population. The population is at the same time the real terrain of the war. . . .

The second law. The support from the population is not spontaneous, and in any case must be organized. It can be obtained only through the efforts of the minority among the population that favors the counterinsurgent.

The third law. This minority will emerge, and will be followed by the majority, only if the counterinsurgent is seen as the ultimate victor. . . .

The fourth law. The population's attitude is dictated not by the intrinsic merits of the contending causes, but by the answer to these two simple questions: Which side is going to win? Which side threatens the most, and which offers the most protection?<sup>126</sup>

These conclusions say little about the substance of politics; rather, they emphasize technical solutions to political problems and are echoed persistently through today's counterinsurgency doctrine of the United States.

Interestingly, although Galula has been largely unknown in France, the French School of revolutionary warfare has been best represented in practice by Generals Marcel Bigeard and Jacques Massu and in theory by Colonel Charles Lacheroy (later a member of the quasi-fascist Organisation de l'Armée Secrete), General Jacques Hogard, and Colonel Roger Trinquier.<sup>127</sup> Of all these officers, Trinquier in particular had the greatest influence on US counterinsurgency practice in Vietnam and Latin America; his *Modern Warfare* was translated into English and taught in US military school and staff colleges while Trinquier himself corresponded extensively with the instructors at those institutions.<sup>128</sup> Trinquier's service in Indochina and his organization of proxy militias of Thai and Meo highlanders—something the US military emulated when fighting their own war in Vietnam—made Trinquier particularly relevant to the US Army in

the 1960s.<sup>129</sup> Aside from having been fictionalized in Jean Lartéguy's roman à clef of French revolutionary warfare, *The Centurions*, Trinquier, Massu, and Bigeard also appear thinly disguised in Gilo Pontecorvo's remarkable film *Battle of Algiers*. After the war, Trinquier went on to help Moïse Tshombé of Katanga Province organize his military forces. In the 1990s, when the archives of the war had been declassified in France and a revision of the history of the Algerian war had begun, at least in the academy, alongside scholarly histories, Trinquier made appearances in Paul Aussaresses's memoir of the war, *The Battle of the Casbah*, and in Marie-Monique Robin's documentary film and book *Escadrons de la Mort*, about French counterinsurgency's influence on Latin American juntas.<sup>130</sup>

Perhaps what distinguishes the French School (and Trinquier) from Galula is the former's explicit emphasis on exogenous (read, communist) causes of insurgency and an unabashed advocacy of the use of "whatever means necessary," including disavowal of the law and norms of warfare.<sup>131</sup> If Galula is supremely sensitive to image and representation in fighting a counterinsurgency, then Trinquier sees the military as an instrument of raw power and does not apologize for brutality or for breaching fairness in fighting:

For the partisan and the irregular who oppose a regular army, the very fact that they violate the rules of warfare in fighting without a uniform (avoiding the risks involved) deprives them of the protection of these same rules. If taken prisoner while armed, they may be shot on the spot.<sup>132</sup>

Trinquier underscores propaganda and police action as central to suppression of urban revolt and breaks down these actions into a series of elements that include mass interrogation of the population, closure of neighborhoods, curfews and night arrests, the use of prison camps to accommodate large-scale detention of dissidents, and an unquestioning metropolitan government that will not criticize "the forces of order" in the colony.<sup>133</sup> After the suppression of the Casbah in 1958, Trinquier was involved in the fortification and sealing off of the Morice line, the martial barrier of barbed wire and watchtowers that enclosed Algeria, preventing the movement of Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) guerrillas across borders into Algeria.

In the suppression of the Casbah, Trinquier not only called on his experience of counterinsurgency warfare in Indochina but also referred to historical

tactics of urban pacification. Remembering Napoléon's methods of conquest in the Rhine Valley, Trinquier, as head of the Dispositif de Protection Urbaine, "began by numbering each house and counting and identifying its inhabitants," gathering the names of inhabitants of each dwelling, cross-checking the information against that gathered from the neighbors, and applying the same methods of *quadrillage* used in rural areas to different quarters of the city.<sup>134</sup> He appointed loyal Muslim veterans as informers in each of these grid squares, placing the informants in the odious position of being targeted for assassination for their collaboration.<sup>135</sup> The extensive method of surveillance is estimated to have resulted in the detention of some 30–40 percent of all men of the Casbah, arrested at night "so that any colleagues they named under interrogation could be grabbed before the lifting of the curfew" and often subjected to torture, because in the words of Trinquier himself, the "rights of the innocent [victims of FLN operations] overrode those of the guilty."<sup>136</sup>

Trinquier had, like many other French officers who served in Algeria, been marked by the defeat of France at the hand of the Viet Minh in Indochina and viewed the Algerian national struggle as part of a larger communist conspiracy, eliding the FLN to the Viet Minh, to the point of calling the Algerian *fellagah* fighters "the Viet" and seeking an idea, even an ideology, that would defeat the attraction of the communist worldview.<sup>137</sup> Peter Paret's fascinating analysis of this search for an ideology is also reflected in Lartéguy's *The Centurions*, where one of the French officers declares, "I don't believe in God, but I feel I am bound up with Christian civilization."<sup>138</sup> The sense of a civilizational battle underlies what Paret calls the French military's "revolutionary change in their concept of duty and ethics as well as in their tactics."<sup>139</sup> While the adherents of this revolutionary vision of warfare indicate the importance of fighting a war among the people, they also call for unquestioning support of the military forces by the political echelons in the metropole. In some senses, this demand lies at the heart of varieties of stab-in-the-back stories, which insist that, although the military was victorious on the battlefield, politicians squandered the victory because of cowardice or cravenness.<sup>140</sup> Trinquier himself wrote that "the army, whose responsibility it is to do battle, must receive the unreserved, affectionate, and devoted support of the nation."<sup>141</sup> This narrative also echoes through subsequent reevaluations of the US war in Vietnam, where, the story goes, the introduction of counterinsurgency measures effectively won the war

on the ground, but for the erosion of support for the US forces at home at the hand of the media and a cowardly political class.<sup>142</sup>

*Rostow and Vann*

We can learn to prevent the emergence of the famous sea in which Mao Tse-tung taught his men to swim. This requires, of course, not merely a proper military program of deterrence, but programs of village development, communications and indoctrination.

*Walt Rostow, 1961*<sup>143</sup>

Among the countless names associated with the US war in Vietnam, I refer to only two people whose ideas and practices have indelibly marked not only the course of that war and the narratives about it—told both contemporaneously and in retrospect—but also the language and practice of US counterinsurgency in all the decades since. If Walt Whitman Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth*, with its very revealing subtitle—*A Non-Communist Manifesto*—was a sort of manual of developmentalist military intervention, John Paul Vann, expansively commemorated in Neil Sheehan's *A Bright Shining Lie*, became its counterinsurgent man on the ground and iconoclast.

Rostow is unusual among advocates of asymmetric warfare in being subsequently an enthusiastic supporter of carpet bombing enemies to shape their behavior.<sup>144</sup> He had had a role in choosing targets for the Allied strategic bombings during the Second World War, and he was crucial in introducing guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency to John F. Kennedy as a major tactic of war in the Third World.<sup>145</sup> Rostow, an economic historian who had studied seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British economic growth and who was to coin the phrase “The New Frontier” for Kennedy and become national security adviser to Lyndon Johnson, had a clearly delineated ideological program to rival Marxist political economy. In his *Stages of Growth*, he outlined a universal trajectory of development that he believed social and economic engineering could reproduce the world over. The five stages began with traditional societies, which then developed preconditions for takeoff, went through takeoff, consolidated their gains, and arrived at “the age of high consumption.”<sup>146</sup> The magical ingredients for this trajectory were compound interest

and entrepreneurship. Rostow, like all other modernization theorists, made a sharp distinction between tradition and modernity, and he saw the emergence of Third World resistance movements as “a disease of the transition” and the Third World revolutionaries as “scavengers of modernization.”<sup>147</sup> Like so many other modernization theorists, whose viewpoints continue to shape scholarship, folk wisdom, and policy, Rostow was a liberal internationalist who saw a particular virtue in the extension of US hegemony, always envisioned as world leadership, not a new version of imperialism. For these theorists, reforms that guaranteed individual freedom, capitalism, and adherence to liberal norms would circumvent revolutions. “Nationalism” was always promoted as the bulwark against communism, even if Rostow thought that the concepts of nationalism and national sovereignty were premodern residues.<sup>148</sup> For Rostow, the nationalism to be encouraged through US military and economic aid was not the nationalism of Asian and African anticolonialists, “but nationalism on *our* terms: nationalism without revolution, or revolution which we would run for them—revolution, it turned out, without revolution.”<sup>149</sup> Ultimately, Rostow saw the massive struggles throughout the Tricontinents as only adjuncts to the “Eurasian arena of power, as determined by relative stages-of-growth and of military potential,” a world redeemed through the planetary spread of US-style mass consumerism.<sup>150</sup>

While Rostow played great-power chess in Washington, DC, another hero of today’s counterinsurgents, John Paul Vann, developed his ideas and approaches in the field. Vann had been a military adviser in Vietnam in 1962, but he was forced to leave for considering the US Army hierarchy too accommodating to Vietnamese corruption and cowardice.<sup>151</sup> He returned to Vietnam in 1965 as an official of the US Agency for International Development. He thought the solution to Vietnamese weakness was “a strong, dynamic, ruthless, colonialist-type ambassador with the authority to relieve generals, mission chiefs and every other bastard who does not follow a stated, clear-cut policy which, in itself, at a minimum, involved the US in the hiring and firing of the Vietnamese leaders.”<sup>152</sup> But like Rostow and other modernization theorists, he also believed that a social revolution had been in progress in Vietnam and that unless the United States learned to harness it, the communists would capture the revolution.<sup>153</sup> Although his program of reform and democracy included nothing about land reform or redistributive policies, he advocated US-centric ideologies

about weakening central governments by calling for devolution of power from the Vietnamese government to district governors who would be closely shadowed and monitored by American military advisers.<sup>154</sup> He eventually became an officer of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, which was colonized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and aimed to “neutralize” the VCI, the Viet Cong Infrastructure, the euphemism for civilian supporters of guerrilla fighters. Vann believed that a CORDS adviser in a given district had to know

in detail the district’s political, social, educational, and demographic structure; the local economy; the strengths and effectiveness of all components of friendly and enemy forces; the strengths and weakness of local political and military leaders; the training equipment of South Vietnamese forces (ARVN to police); the steps being taken to improve those forces; and the location of all friendly, contested, and enemy-controlled hamlets.<sup>155</sup>

This local knowledge was necessary to bring the local civilian populations to the side of the South Vietnamese government. Subsequent military analysts and officers frequently cite CORDS as a successful prototype of unity of command in counterinsurgency and a model to be emulated in subsequent counterinsurgencies.<sup>156</sup> Vann’s most famous maxim is often quoted as the motto of counterinsurgency: “This is a political war and it calls for discrimination in killing. The best weapon for killing would be a knife, but I’m afraid we can’t do it that way. The worst is an airplane. The next worst is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle—you know who you’re killing.”<sup>157</sup> Vann—who counted Robert Thompson and a whole raft of powerful journalists among his admirers—was, alongside Bob Komer, who ran CORDS, and General Creighton Abrams, who took Westmoreland’s place, a major advocate of Vietnamization of the war, or shifting the burden of fighting to the Vietnamese security forces.<sup>158</sup>

It was precisely this rupture that framed—and continues to shape—the metanarrative of counterinsurgency: the story begins with a lumbering, conventional, and conservative counterinsurgent military using its firepower and technical prowess to bomb an unequal enemy into submission, all the while stoking native hostility not only with force of arms but also with naive racism. Then arrive unconventional—in both senses of the word—thinkers and

military men, rebels who anger the bureaucracy around them, who, against their racist colleagues, believe that all peoples of the world deserve democracy and who look for more humane ways of acquiring local allegiances through virtuous behavior, humility, and the provision of security (and resources and social goods).<sup>159</sup> In his memoir of the Vietnam War, CIA operative Rufus Phillips, who had loyally worked in civic action and who admired Vann's work in the field, retold this narrative about the highest echelon of US military in Vietnam:

Abrams had moved out of Westmoreland's palatial villa into a smaller house near the MACV headquarters. He habitually wore field fatigues instead of the spit-and-polish uniform with resplendent ribbons, or sharply tailored fatigues, that most often been Westmoreland's attire. . . . Abrams wanted to make the Vietnamese army and the local forces work, which Westmoreland never understood or was interested in. Also he wanted to humanize MACV and its command image. . . . General Abrams would also address the security of Saigon as a priority. In a very short time he would stop the rocketing through aggressive day-and-night patrolling and by the stationing of helicopter gunships in continuous night-time orbit over likely firing positions, among other tactics.<sup>160</sup>

Abrams was also viewed as the man who would have effectively won the war, had he not been betrayed by the journalists and politicians at home.<sup>161</sup>

#### CONCLUSION: THE ELEMENTS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

A series of recurring themes emerges out of the liberal counterinsurgencies of the twentieth century and comes to be profoundly important in shaping the twenty-first-century thinking of the US counterinsurgents. Perhaps most striking among these themes is the idea that imperial policing should be humane, set against practices of warfare that are anything but. This constant seesawing between the idea of violently *detering* the civilian from supporting the insurgents and the notion that these civilians would be best *persuaded* to disavow the insurgents is vastly different from the nineteenth-century counterinsurgencies in which mass slaughter, scorched-earth tactics, *razzias*, looting, rape, and destruction were commonplace instruments of asymmetric warfare.

Another recurring and related theme is the centrality of the population and the idea of counterinsurgency as either simultaneous or sequential application

of military force and civic action. The population is the prize in asymmetric warfare. This emphasis also distinguishes modern counterinsurgencies from their nineteenth-century predecessors. The emergence of population as a concept of study, warfare, and manipulation emerged most apparently in the mass incarceration of civilians in a number of twentieth- and twenty-first-century counterinsurgencies, and is central to the liberal idea of warfare, both to be discussed in subsequent chapters.

If a population is an object of warfare and civic action, it has to be studied, categorized, known. The vector of civilization and barbarity become crucial not only for determining whom the counterinsurgent is fighting but also for determining how to fight and what is permitted. Savages and barbarians are less subject to the grace of law and regulated warfare than a civilized adversary. The racialization of the “native” is so prevalent and so inherent in the discourse of liberal counterinsurgency that it even emerges when the metropolitan force seeks local allies. These allies are needed to bear the brunt of the fighting—or continue it after the metropolitan force leaves—and they are needed to present the indigenous face of the counterinsurgency to both local and international publics. But despite their centrality to this type of asymmetric war, they are also subjected to the same racialization. Indeed, the “savagery” of a proxy army can be both an alibi for the metropolitan army and a tool of warfare on which it depends. Finally, the standard of civilization also comes to be important in weaving the legitimating discourse around asymmetric warfare, because a war that brings with it civilization, liberation, and emancipation is much easier to sell to a public that might be skeptical about its costs.

Given the deliberate rooting of today’s US and Israeli counterinsurgency doctrines in past practice, then, it is not surprising that these themes will also appear in the fundamental texts of the militaries of the counterinsurgent forces of these two states.